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In his article, Corporate Liabilityfor ExtraterritorialTorts Under the Alien
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, Professor Alan Sykes applies a
law-and-economics approach to the questions of whether it makes sense for
U.S. courts (1) to be able to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over international
law violations committed or facilitated by individuals (2) whose actions can be
attributed to corporations that are (3) within the personal jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.
Professor Sykes has previously studied the question of when and whether
corporate shareholders should be held financially responsible for the harmful
conduct of corporate agents (question 2 above).' Broadly speaking, vicarious
liability makes the most sense when shareholders can actually influence corporate behavior.2 In addition, Professor Sykes has explored the effects of liability
for extraterritorial torts on the competitiveness of companies subject to U.S.

jurisdiction (question 3 above).3 His analyses have suggested that differential
exposure to liability for companies that are otherwise similarly situated might
distort investment decisions and lead to inefficient outcomes.4 These questions
implicate far more than the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).' They merit continued and
serious study, which Professor Sykes's most recent contribution will doubtless
advance. My brief response focuses on the implications of Professor Sykes's

analysis for the interpretation and application of the ATS, a provision in the

* Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. @ 2012, Chimbne I.
Keitner.
1. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, in FOUNDA.lONS OF TORT LAw 181 (Saul

Levmore ed., 1994); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
2. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Liabilityfor ExtraterritorialTorts Under the Alien Tort
Statute and Beyond: An EconomicAnalysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2179-80, 2197-2200, 2205 (2012).
3. Alan 0. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. LEGAL

STUD. 339 (2008).
4. Id. at 349-61.

5. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
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First Judiciary Act that gives U.S. federal courts adjudicatory jurisdiction over a
limited number of international law violations that exhibit a requisite degree of
specificity and universal acceptance. 6
The question from a law-and-economics perspective is: Does enabling plaintiffs to bring suits against corporations under the ATS do more harm than good?
Professor Sykes's answer is: It depends. Specifying the conditions under which
corporate ATS liability is most likely to deter harmful conduct by corporate
agents seems eminently useful to lawmakers who must ultimately decide whether
to modify the existing statutory regime and to "cause lawyers" who view ATS
litigation as a tool for enforcing human rights norms, deterring harmful conduct,
and providing symbolic validation and monetary restitution to victims. Professor Sykes suggests that information regarding the actual deterrent value of ATS
cases can also be useful to judges engaged in statutory interpretation; although
this might be true, courts are not primarily charged with weighing such policy
considerations, and it is far from clear that they are well equipped to do so. In
fact, judges often take pains to deny that their decisions are motivated by policy
preferences, even when such preferences appear to have played a large role in a
given case.'
Although the ATS is terse, it is not fundamentally indeterminate. Traditional
doctrinal analysis can answer many of the questions that arise in interpreting
and applying the ATS, including, in my view, the question of corporate liability.8 Nevertheless, it is still important to understand the policy implications of
particular constructions of the ATS because the ATS remains subject to both
judicial interpretation and legislative revision.
Professor Sykes's article offers a framework for analyzing the potential
policy implications of various liability regimes for corporations involved in
human rights violations outside of the United States. In his assessment, corporate ATS liability will produce the worst outcomes if the following assumptions
hold true:
* Companies are fungible, which means that companies subject to ATS
liability (and thereby subject to additional costs for collaborating with
repressive regimes) will simply be replaced by readily available substitutes willing to aid and abet human rights violations;' and

6. Sosa v.Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-31 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Chimbne I. Keitner, The Politics of CorporateAlien Tort Cases, 2011 PEPP. L. REV.
ONLINE 23, 27 (discussing Judge Pierre Leval's dissent from the denial of rehearing by the panel in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d. Cir. 2011)).
8. Chimbne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 61, 74

(2008) (arguing that the most coherent approach views international law as the source of conductregulating rules that trigger federal jurisdiction under the ATS and domestic law as the source of
non-conduct-regulating rules).
9. See Sykes, supra note 2, at 2200.
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* Repressive regimes are more likely to continue violating human rights if
they interact with companies from other countries with repressive regimes, so deterring companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction from collaborating with those regimes will actually foster further abuses.o
By contrast, a lack of corporate ATS liability could be problematic if the
following is true:
* Companies will be deterred from conducting operations within the
United States by a liability regime that makes extraterritorial torts
relatively cheap, thereby creating additional inefficiencies by channeling
investment outside of the United States."
In sum, in this view, inefficiencies are most likely to arise when there is
differential liability for the same conduct engaged in by different actors or in
different geographic locations. Viewed in this light, ATS liability appears as one
manifestation of the broader problem of differential liability regimes that can
inform (or "distort") investment decisions and encourage forum shopping when
litigation ensues.
By examining ATS liability through the lens of these potential inefficiencies,
Professor Sykes's analysis enables us to isolate at least three critiques, which
might be called the "failed deterrence" critique, the "competitive disadvantage"
critique, and the "inefficient compensation" critique of corporate ATS liability. I
address each in turn below.

I.

THE "FAILED DETERRENCE" CRITIQUE

Professor Sykes indicates that in cases involving corporate aiding and abetting liability, one should ask whether imposing liability provides "an incentive
for the aider and abettor to withhold assistance important to the commission of
the harmful act" so that "the likelihood or seriousness of the harmful act will be
diminished."' 2 In his view, the utility of aiding and abetting liability "is greatest
when the purported aider and abetter provides a form of assistance that is either
essential to the wrongful act or that makes it significantly easier (cheaper) to
perpetrate, and when the primary wrongdoer cannot obtain comparable assistance from some other actor who will escape civil liability."' 3 Consequently, in
his view, although human rights violations could perhaps be deterred by holding
corporations liable for the direct commission or co-perpetration of human rights
violations by their agents, aiding and abetting liability will not serve any
purpose if repressive regimes can easily find other collaborators.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 2200-02.
See id. at 2193-97.
Id. at 2188.
Id. at 2203.
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Professor Sykes's example of Talisman Energyl 4 actually suggests some
potential benefits of ATS liability that might not be fully captured by an
economic analysis. Professor Sykes invokes the Talisman Energy example as a
case of a company from a liberal state abandoning an investment as a result of
exposure to ATS liability and being replaced by a company from an illiberal
state, with no resulting deterrence of the Sudanese regime's behavior.' 5 In my
view, using the Talisman Energy example for this purpose gives ATS liability
both too much credit and too little. It gives ATS liability too much credit
because Talisman's divestment from its project in the Sudan appears to have
been the result of a much broader divestment campaign that produced, among
other things, a credible threat by the U.S. Congress to delist Talisman shares
from the New York Stock Exchange.' 6 It gives ATS liability too little credit
because such liability (and the broader campaign of which the lawsuit against
Talisman formed a part) appears to have had a profound impact on Talisman
itself, which now prides itself on being a leader in the field of corporate
transparency in its other global activities.' 7 Thus, although ATS liability did not
deter the Sudanese regime's conduct, it does appear to have played some role in
reshaping the corporate culture at Talisman Energy.
One might think of this as the difference between specific and general
deterrence. Even assuming that the Sudanese government is beyond the power
of ATS liability to deter, such liability might be part of a broader set of
strategies for promoting internalization of corporate social responsibility norms
that have broader effects in reducing the harms caused by various corporate
activities, particularly in countries whose own legal and regulatory frameworks
are not well equipped to control or avoid those harms. Moreover, ATS jurisprudence has served an important function in articulating norms for corporate
behavior that, in turn, can exert a compliance pull even beyond the framework
of formal adjudication. 18 These potential benefits should factor into an assessment of the costs and benefits of the current liability regime.

14. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
15. See Sykes, supra note 2, at 2195.
16. See Reg Manhas, Talisman in Sudan: Impacts of Divestment, COMPACT QUARrERLY (Mar. 16,
2007), http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e-article0OO0775162.cfm?x=bl1,0,w. Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has expressed the view that: "Concern that the expected cost of potential
future ATS suits will cause corporations to withdraw from [Less Developed Countries] appears to be
little more than hyperbole, lacking empirical support." Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 5, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, No. 11-88 (Dec. 21, 2011), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme court-preview/briefs/10-1491_.petitioner
amcu-stiglitz.authcheckdam.pdf.
17. Manhas, supra note 16.
18. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 30, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie) (characterizing decisions in ATS cases as
the "largest body of domestic jurisprudence regarding corporate responsibility for international crimes").

HeinOnline -- 100 Geo. L.J. 2214 2011-2012

2012]

OPTIMIZING LIABLITY FOR

H.

EXTRATERRITORIAL ToRTS

2215

THE "COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE" CRITIQUE

The "competitive disadvantage" critique also appears to give the ATS both
too much and too little credit. Professor Sykes notes that "[aillegations of
complicity in human rights abuse and similar egregious misconduct can seriously damage corporate reputations, resulting in substantial market penalties
from customers or other business partners troubled by such allegations."' 9
Certainly, a lawsuit brought under the ATS might provide a vehicle and vocabulary for the articulation of complaints about alleged corporate misconduct.
However, as the Talisman Energy example illustrates, there are myriad other
channels for such pressures. It is not clear that ATS liability, or lack thereof,
actually has a significant marginal effect one way or the other. Moreover,
insulating companies from the potentially negative impact on share prices from
reputational damage in the name of a level playing field would create other
problems because, as Professor Sykes observes, "[w]hen businesses do not pay
for the harms that they cause, their costs of doing business are lower than they
should be from a social standpoint, resulting in lower prices and an undue
expansion of risky activity." 20
Differential liability regimes can arise from a number of factors, including
the presence or absence of judicial fora for entertaining complaints, differences
in applicable substantive law, different pleading requirements and abstention
doctrines, and so forth. Over time, ATS liability could become less important as
more complainants seek local redress 2 1 or turn to other fora, including European
courts.2 2 At the time of writing, the largest award against a corporation for
environmental damage (which is not currently actionable under the ATS) came
from a court in Ecuador, not the United States.2 3 In this sense, the world is
becoming increasingly "flat." 2 4 The ATS might have been a statute ahead of its
time in providing a federal (as opposed to state) forum for adjudicating law of
19. Sykes, supra note 2, at 2195.

20. Id. at 2184.
21. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1444, 1447 (2011) (examining the problem

of "forum shopper's remorse" in light of the spread of U.S.-style litigation and pro-plaintiff judgments
in other countries).
22. For example, Shell initially agreed to settle a class action suit brought in the United Kingdom
relating to two oil spills in Nigeria. See Sylvia Pfeifer & Jane Croft, Shell's Nigeria Payout Could Top
$400-million, GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 3, 2011, 3:12 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/intemational-news/african-and-mideast/article2ll8618.ece. When settlement negotiations broke
down, the plaintiffs refiled their claims in London's high court. Jane Croft, Shell Faces Claim Over
Niger Delta Spills, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4132be9e-

7423-1 lel-9951-00144feab49a.html#axzzlrobz0kjw. The 2000 Brussels regulation on jurisdiction has
been interpreted by the European Court of Justice as requiring courts to assert jurisdiction over locally
domiciled defendants. Case C-281102, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383, I] 23-35.
23. Naomi Mapstone, Ecuador Court Upholds $18bn Chevron Ruling, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 4,
2012, 4:19 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2404598-367c- 1le I-a3fa-00144feabdcO.html#axzzln
LMG7Ygl.
24. See THOMAs L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD is FLAr A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2005).
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nations violations, but there seems to be little empirical support for the proposition that it unduly burdens companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction with excessive
obligations or exposure compared to their non-U.S. counterparts.

III. THE

"INEFFICIENT COMPENSATION" CRITIQUE

It is no doubt true, as law and economics scholars have long observed, that
"civil litigation is an extremely expensive mechanism for shifting money around
from one person's pocket to another." 2 5 Indeed, ATS cases against individual
human rights violators have been particularly inefficient at doing this because
many of the damages awards have been unenforceable due to the lack of
obtainable assets.2 6 As suggested above, these cases have nonetheless played,
and continue to play, an important role in providing symbolic vindication to
victims, engaging U.S. courts in the process of articulating and enforcing
international norms, and-in the case of individual defendants-deterring human rights violators from entering and remaining in the United States. Cases
against corporate defendants may perform the first two of these functions and
may also provide increased opportunities for obtaining compensation. Although
other forms of wealth transfer from corporations to the populations adversely
affected by their activities would likely be more efficient than ATS liability, the
ideal system has yet to be designed and implemented on a global scale. Tort
liability should be compared to the existing alternatives.
In sum, although existing agency laws and jurisdictional rules might not be
optimal, this is not only-or even primarily-a problem with the ATS. As
Professor Sykes indicates, the doctrinal framework for ATS liability is structured to avoid suits that interfere unduly with the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations, that seek to hold companies liable for merely "doing business" in a
country governed by an unsavory regime, that should more appropriately be
heard in another country's courts, and that do not plead sufficiently specific or
universal violations. Absent action by Congress, courts can and should allow the
remaining suits to proceed against individual defendants and against the corporate entities on behalf of which those individuals acted.

25. Sykes, supra note 2, at 2181.
26. E.g., Fildrtiga v. Pefila-Irala, 577 F Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding $10 million
default judgment against a Paraguayan official for torture in Paraguay).
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